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BOOK REVIEW 
11A FASCINATION WITHOUT SCRUPLESu: AMERICAN 
POPULAR CULTURE AND ITS CORROSIVE IMPACT ON 
THE LAW 
When. Law Goes Pop: The V anishlng Line 
Between Law and Popular Culture. 
By Richard K. Sherwin 
c ·hicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2000. 
325 pp. $27.00. 
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST* 
nThe culture of law's rule needs to be studied in the same way 
as other cultures. Each has its founding· myths, its ne.cessary 
beliefs, and its reasons that are internal to its own norms."1 
uobviously, anyone of minimal intelligence over the age of 
four can- more or less- grasp the basic cpntent of a ·film, 
record, ra.dio, or television program without any special 
training. Yet precisely because the media so very closely 
mimic reality, we apprehend them much more easily than we 
comprehend them ... . 11[The] film and the electronic media have 
drastically changed the way we perceive the world .... " [Y]et( 
we all too naturally accept the vast amounts of information 
they convey to us in massive doses without questioning .... ~~2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
fu When Law Goes Pop3, New York Law School Professor 
Richard K. Sherwin formulates a cultural4 and instrumentalist 
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S. 1973, University of 
.Pennsylvania (Wharton School); J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School. I dedicate this 
essay to Teresa}. Faherty 
1 PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCfiNC LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 1 (1999). 
2 }AMES MONACO, HOW TO READ A FILM: THE ART, TECHNOLOGY, LANGUAG:S, 
HisrORY, AND THEoRY OF FILM AND MEDIA vii (1981). 
3 RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOFS.POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW 
AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000). 
4 Among the multiple possible meanings of culture, the most relevant in 
understanding Professor Shenvin's book iS a social-anthropological definition. In 
this regard, a good definition is as follows: 
Cultures ... as defined by their differences, not from nature or animal 
societies, but from each other .... A culture denotes a distirtcl, historic 
group of people C. a society together with all its tools, artifacts, 
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theorys of 11tragic constructivist jurisprudence,116 which he says 
posses.sions, and characteristic ways and conceptions of life . . . . Built 
into it are various presuppositions: 
a. A culture is not a heap of unrelated phenomena, but an organic 
whole, so that eath feature of it, however obvious its biological 
explanation, also has meaning in relation to the others. 
b. So far as its features are unique, or, if shared with other cultures, 
so transformed by their context as to "meanH somf!thing 
substantially different, it too is unique. · 
c. It is extended in time, a.s it must be to be transmissible between 
generations (even an emergent culture has emerged from 
something). 
d. It is also conscious of the fact; so that it conceives itself (in 
varying degrees) jn terms of the past, present and future. 
e. In all of the foregoing respects a culture resembles an indiv~dual, 
and thus possesses a quasi-personal identity~. even though its self-
conscious~ess may be located nowhere but in the minds of its 
individual members, and though it may lack any unitary will. 
f. Though a response to circumstances (some of them of its own 
creation), a culture is a spontaneous growth . . . and (unlike a 
purely sociopolitical ord.er) cannot be invented, planned or 
imposed. 
A COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 100 (David E. Cooper, ed. 1995) hereinafter 
AEsrHErtcs] (emphasis added). 
s Instrumentalist, or furtctual, theories of art presuppose that art serves functions 
for social purposes. See AFSI"HEI'ICS; supra note 4, at 6. An instrumenU.list theory 
then, opposes aesthetic docbines of art whereby art shoulcj be valued for itself 
alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve . . . . Id. 
His~orically. the idea. of art ~or art's sa~e is associated wi~ the cult of beauty, 
which had tts roots 1ll Kantian aesthetics and the Romantic movement . . . . I d. 
The history of instrumentalist/ functional art theory is fascinating, and 
has a very long and distinguished history C one that begins with Plato 
and has persisted in a variety of forms to the present day. The opposing 
idea that genuine art is n~n-functional, that it is always autonomous 
and is produced merely for its own sakel is a comparatively recent 
invention. 
The distinction between the useful arts (or crafts) and arts that serve no 
purpos.e and are att~nded to so_lel.Y as ends in ~emsely-es is not ~v be 
found m Plato or Aristotle; nor ts It to be found :m medteval theones of 
art. It was only at the time of the Renaissance that the notion of fine art 
began to take root as a way of distinguishing the functional from the 
non-functional arts. Up until then, all of what we now call fine art was 
considered to have. a purpose C although in the case of some art forms 
like music and decoration the precise nature of its function was 
specified only with difficulty. 
Functional views of art take at least two distinct fortns. Som.e are 
normative and insist that art ought always to serve a specified function. 
To the extent that a work of art performs itS designated. function, it is 
considered meritorious; reciprocally, when a work fails to serve 'its 
function it is considered inadequate or bad ... referred to as normative 
functionalism. Descriptive functionalism, by contrast, contends that by 
thef.r very nature works of art serve certain metaphysical, psychological, or 
cultural functions, and do so whether or not the artist knows or intends it. 
Descriptive fun(:tionalism treats a particular function as a necessary 
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is "driven ... by the felt need to acknowledge the vicissitudes 
of the irrational"7 while avoiding American popular culture1s 
obsession with "punitive retribution" in response to "the 
predatory other; " the 'alien' among us, the perennial favorite of 
film d TV "8 an .... 
Sherwin's thesis is that while law has always been "shot 
through with [popular] fiction/'9 by virtue of equitable maxirns 
and ancient rhetorical teachings, in recent years 11 (l]egal 
meanings [have been] flattening out· as they yield to the 
compelling visual logic of film and TV images and the market 
forces that fuel their production. "10 Accordingly, in Sherwin's 
view, law has become a "spectacle", like society in general11, 
and as "[a] consequence, the customary balance within the legal 
system among .disparate forms of knowledge, discourse, and 
power is under great strain, and is at risk of breaking down."12 
Sherwin concludes that "what we are seeing today is no 
ordinary intermingling of law and popular culture, but a more 
generalized erosion of law's legitintacy," because "(t]his is what 
happens when law goes pop. "13 
'When Law Goes· Pop on one level is an exposition of what 
21st century American culture finds persuasive and compelling 
as opposed to boring and inconsequential Part II of this Essay, 
feature of all art; although it is true that both descriptive and normative 
functionalists are generally quite happy to allow that particular works 
of art may contingently serve a function on a certain occasion C where 
this function is entirely unrelated to its status as art. 
I d. at 162-63 (emphasis added; selected emphasis in the original). 
6 Se~ SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 9. See COOPER, supra note 4 at 260-64 for a 
synthesis of this proposed jurisprudence. · · 
7 SHERWIN, supra note 3 at 9. 
s Id. 
9 Id. at 3. 
10 ld. at 4 (end note omitted). 
11 ld. at 265, n.4 (citing GUY DEBORD, THE 5oaETY OF SPECTACLE (1995), among 
other sources). 
t2 ld. at 4-5. Sherwin provides two illustrations of this strain: the virtues of the 
lay jury as a practical reflection of community values, expectations, and beliefs 
a.nd the virtues of judicial expertise and prudence being negatively impacted by 
what he calls the homogenous stories and images of popular culture. I d. at 5. He 
goes on to observe, in this regard: 
It .is what happens when the active, off screen dimension of lived 
experience and the varieties of common sense that it produces give way 
to the passive, self-gratification-enhancing, and image-based logic of 
commercial media. Then, the capacity for critical judgment of external 
reality, of self and others, of truth and justice in the individual case, and 
of the media themselves Cis significantly undercut. 
Id. (endnote omitted). 
13 Id. (original emphasis). 
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therefore, discusses three key themes of Sherwin's book: (a) the 
problem of persuasion in a postmodem society14, (b) the 
problem of understanding and dealing with the "jurisprudence 
of appearances,"15 and (c) the problem of popular culture's 
illicit impact on legal advocacy16_ 
Professor Sherwin's account, however, is more than a 
cautionary run1ination on popular culture and legal meaning-
making. It is also a reflection, albeit disjointed and dense at 
times17, on the respective roles of objectivity versus subjectivity 
in legal judgment.18 Accordingly, Part III of this Essay explores 
various notions of legal indeterminacy embedded in Sherwin's 
text.19 
II. WHAT'S HOT/WHAT'S NOT? 
A. The Problem of Persuasion in a Post-Modern Society 
Three outstanding books, published and revised over the 
last two decades, have had a dramatic impact on 
understanding the au courant art and practice of social 
persuasion, each within different, albeit overlapping, spheres.2° 
The first book is Thomas A. Mauet's Trial Techniques.21 Mauet's 
book is a standard text in many law school courses on trial 
advocacy; in the sphere of law this book has taught thousands 
of American lawyers the basics of trial preparation22 and 
14 See infra notes 20-78 and accompanying text. 
1s See infra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. Sherwin defines this concept as 
a form of legal meaning making that adopts the media's visual logic as its own. 
SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 10. 
16 See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. 
17 According to the New York Times: Unfortunately, reading Sherwin is no day 
at the movies. His book is often irksomely repetitive, numbingly abstract and 
studded with hermetic jargon like hyper real and the esthetics of deliberate 
norntative construction. 
PAOLA. WEISSMAN, Book Rev. Yo, Your Honor!, N.Y. TIMES 40 (Dec. 10, 2000), at 
40. 
ts Indeed, one of the most edifying features of Sherwin1s book is the way it 
stimulates one to think of the parallels between aesthetic judgment and legal 
judgment. See infra notes 109 .. 121 and accompanying text. 
19 Id. 
2o For other interesting and informative literature on various aspects of 
persuasion and rhetoric see AA Brief Primer on Rhetorical Theory" in Robert F. 
Blomquist, The Trial of William Jefferson Clinton: Impartial Justice, The Court of 
Impeachment and Ranked Vignettes of Praiseworthy Senatorial Rhetoric, 84 MARQ. L. 
REv. 383, 398-402 (2000). 
21 THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES (4th ed. 1996). 
22 Professor Mauet notes: 
My experiences as a trial lawyer and trial advocacy teacher have made 
me realize that effective trial lawyers always seem to have two 
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strategy.23 In this regard, Mauet discusses the re·ality that 
11 U]ury trials are the princip.al method by which . we resolve 
legal disputes parties cannot settle themselves through less 
formal methods,"24 the differentiated roles of the judge, the 
jury, and the advocates within the American trial scheme2S, and 
the fourfold tools ''the litigants have, and [their lawyers] must 
understand" in influencing the outcome of trial.26 
complimentary abilities. First~ they have developed an effective method 
for analyzing and preparing each case for trial. Second, they have the 
technical skills necessary to present their side of a case persuasively 
during trial. It is the combination of both qualities C preparation and 
execution C that produces effective trial advocacy. 
This text approaches trial advocacy the same way. It presents a method 
of trial preparation and reviews the thought processes a trial lawyer 
uses before and during each phase of a trial. In addition, it discusses 
and gives examples of the basic teclurical courtroom skills that must be 
developed to present evidence and arguments persuasively to the jury. 
This is done in the firm belief that effective trial advocacy is both an art 
and a skill, and that while a few trial lawyers may be hom, most are 
made. Artistry becomes possible only after basic skills have become 
mastered. 
Id. at xix. Mauet's book consists of ten chapters which discuss, in broad terms, 
the following topics of trial preparation and teclmique: jury sele·ction, opening 
statements, direct examination, exhibits, cross-examination, experts, closing 
arguments, objections, and trial prepe)ration and strategy. Id. · 
23 Mauet devotes a substantial portion of his final chapter to strategic 
considerations of a trial. For Mauet trial strategy boils down to eight key factors: 
(1) develop[ing] a persuasive theory of the case; (2) develop[mg] persuasive 
themes; (3) develop[ing] persuasive labels for people, places, [and]. events; (4) 
identify[ing] the key disputed issues; (5) develop[ing] ... important facts on the 
disputed issues; (6) persu[ing] only what [can] realistically [be] accomplish[ed]; 
(7) anticipat[ing] [the] opponent's strategy; and (8) anticipat[ing] problems and 
weaknesses. ld. at 497. 
24 ld. at 1. Mauet goes on to point out: Although alternative dispute resolution 
methods such as arbitration, mediation; summary trials, private trials, and the 
like are becoming increasingly important, jury trials in the federal and . state 
courts remain the most important dispute--resolving method in the United States. · 
I d. For some re<:ent scholarship on alternative dispute resolution in America, and 
a sampling of othe.r interesting and infortnative li~erature on various aspects of 
persuasion and rhetoric see the discussion and sources cited in Robert F. 
Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and (Ve-ry Brief) Pragmatic Observations on 
Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution in America, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 
343-50 (2000). 
25 MAUEr, supra note 21, at 1. 
26 Jd. at 1-2 .. Mauet observes: 
In our jury trial system, the jury determines the facts, the judge 
determines the law, and the lawyers act as advocates for the litigants. 
Our adversary system is premised on the belief that pitting two 
advers~es against each other, with each interested in pres.enting her 
version of the truth, is the best way for the jury to determine the 
probable truth. The tools the litigants have, and must understand, are 
fourfold; substantive law, procedural law, evidence law, and persuasion 
law. The first three, being principally legal, can be learned in a few 
years. The last, the psychology of persuasion, is what fascinates true trial 
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A second noteworthy book on the art and practice of 
persuasion is Robert B. Cialdini's Influence: The Psychology of 
. Persuasion27• This best-selling28 book. is on the syllabi of several 
· undergraduate and graduate business schools; within the 
sphere of advertising and marketing, Cialdini's text has 
influenced media professionals and sales executives who 
peddle everything from automobiles to soap to political 
candidates.29 Cialdini's book consists of what he characterizes 
as a "shtdy of compliance."30 The impetus for his study is 
humorous but interesting. As he explains: 
With personally disquieting frequency, I have always found 
myself in possession of unwanted magazine subscriptions or 
tickets to the sanitation workers' ball. Probably this long-
standing status as sucker accounts for my interest in the study 
of compliance: Just what are the factors that cause one person 
to say yes to another person? And which techniques most 
effectively use these factors to bring about such compliance? I 
wondered why it is that a request stated in a certain way will 
be rejected, while a request that asks for the same favor in a 
slightly different fashion will be successfuJ.31 
Cialdini identifies and discusses six "weapons of 
influence"32 that exploit "a fundamental psychological principle 
that directs human behavior and, in so doing, gives the tactics 
their power. 1133 These persuasive weapons consist, according to 
Cialdini, of: (1) reciprocation, used with great effectiveness by 
the Hari Krishna Society in airports during the 1970s, whereby 
humans believe nthat we should try to repay, in kind, what 
another person has provided us;"34 (2) commitment and 
lawyers, and they spend a lifetime learning about, and learning how to 
apply, psychology in the courtroom. · 
I d. (emphasis added). 
27 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (rev. ed. 1993). 
28 According to the back cover, with more than one quarter of a million copies 
sold worldwide, Influence has established itself as the most important book on 
persuasion ever published. Id. 
29 See e.g, }OE MCGINNISS~ THE SELLING OF 1HE PRESIDENT (1969); l<IKU ADAITO, 
PICTURE PERFECT: THE ART AND ARTIFACE OF PuBLIC IMAGE-MAKING (1993); 
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PREsiDENCY (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
1969)(1992) (As an example of recent books on the specific province of political 
advertising). 
30 CIALDINI, supra note 27, at xi. 
31 ld; Cf. ROGER FISHER& WILUAM URY, GEri'ING TO YES (1981). 
'32 CIALDINI, supra note 27, at 1-16. 
33 Id. at xiii. 
34 I d. at 17. Professor Cialdini expounds on this first principle of persuasion by 
noting: 
H a woman does us a favor, we should do her one in return; if a man 
sends us a birthday present, we should remember his birthday with a 
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consistency, explaining why people who bet on a horse at the 
racetrack "are much more confident of their horse's chances of 
winning than they are intmediately before laying down that 
bet;"35 (3) social proof, which causes people to assess correct 
behavior by "find[ing] out what other people think is correct;"36 
(4) liking, the chief influence on Tupperware partygoers who 
"buy from ... a friend rather than an . . .. own salesperson;"37 
(5) authority, the "deep-seated sense of duty to authority within 
_gift of our own; if a .couple. invites us to ·a _party, we should be sure to 
invite them to one of ours. By virtue of the reciprocity rule, then, we are 
obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the 
like. So typical is it for indebtedness to accompany the receipt of such 
things that a term like much obliged has become a synonym for thank 
you, not only in the English language but in others as well. 
ld. at 18 (original emphasis). 
35 Id. at 57. Oaldini points out that prominent psychological theorists have, 
viewed the desire for consistency as, a central motivator of our behavior and that 
A[t]he drive to be (and look) consistent .constitutes a highly potent weapon of 
social influence, often causing us to act in ways that are clearly contrary to our 
own best interests. I d. at 59. · 
' . 
3,6 I d. at 116. The social logic of this weapon of influence is as follows: 
]d. 
We view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree 
that we see others performing it. Whether the question is what to do 
with an empty popcorn box in a movie theater, how fast to drive on a 
certain stretch of highway, or how to eat the chicken at a dinner party, 
the, actions of those around us will be important in defining the answer. 
37 Id. at 168., As Cialdini observes, however, the psychological dynamics of a 
Tupperware party are impacted by several weapons · of influence the 
quihtessential American compliance setting: 
Anybody familiar . with the workings of a Tupperware party will 
recognize the use of the varioUs weapons of influence ... : reciprocity (to 
start, games are played and prizes won by the partygoers; anyone who 
doesn't win a prize gets to reach into a grab bag for hers so that 
everyone has received a gift before the buying_ begins), commitment 
(each participant is urged to describe publicly the uses and benefits she 
has found irt the Tupperware she already owns), and social proof (once 
the buying b~gins, each purchase builds the idea that other, similar 
people want the product, therefore, it must be good). 
All the major weapons of influence are present to help things along, but 
the real pOUJer of the Tupperware party ,comes from a pa.rticular ,arrangement 
that trades on the liking rule. Despite the entertaining and persuasive 
salesmanship of the Tupperware demonstrator, the true requests to 
purchase tht:! product does not come from this stranger; it comes from a 
friend to every woman in the room. Oh, the Tupperware r~presentative 
may physically ask for each partygoer's order, all r~ght, b.ut the more 
psychologically compelling requester is a housewife sitting off to the side~. 
smiling, chatting, and serving refreshments. She is the party hostess; who has 
called her friends together for the demonstration in her home and who, 
everyone knows, makes a profit from each piece sold at her party. 
I d. at 167-68 (emphasis added). Liking is a powerful persuader in jury trials. As 
Clarence ,Darrow once said: The main work of a trial attorney is to make a jury 
like his client. ld. at 167. 
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us all"38 such that even symbols of authority like the late actor 
Robert Young who played a physician on a popular television 
show selling Sanka brand coffee with the quasi-medicinal 
message "the 100% Real Coffee that lets you be your best;"39 
and (6) scarcity, whereby if something is characterized as "rare 
or beconling rare" it is generally perceived to be valuable.40 
Finally, James Monaco's How to Read a Film: The Art, 
Technology, LAnguage, History and Theory of Film and Media,41 
viewed by many as the basic book on film and media,42 is a 
third exceptional book that examines the culture of persuasion 
by focusing on fi1In and other visual media.43 Monaco informs 
us along these lines that "[f]ilm is not a language in the sense 
that English, French, or mathematics is,"44 because filn1 has no 
gramntati.cal conventions and nit is not necessary to learn a 
vocabulary. 1145 Indeed, "[i]nfants appear to understand 
38 I d. at 213. 
39 Id. at 221. Indeed, 
I d. 
There are several kinds of symbols that can reliably trigger our 
compliance in the absence of the genuine substance of authority. 
Consequently, they are employed extensively by those compliance 
professionals who are short on substance. Con artists, for example, 
drape themselves with the titles, clothes, and trappings of authority. 
They love nothing more than to emerge elegantly dressed from a fine 
automobile and to introduce themselves to their prospective mark as 
Doctor or Judge or Professor or Commissioner Someone. They 
understand that when they are so equipped, their chances for 
compliance are greatly increased. 
40 ld. at 239. 
I d. 
Collectors of everything from baseball cards to antiques are keenly 
aware of the influence of the scarcity principle in deterntining the worth 
of an item .... -Especially enlightening as to the importance of scarcity in 
the collectibles market is the phenomenon of the precious mistake. 
Flawed items C a blurred stamp or a double-struck coin C are 
sometimes the most valued of all .... With the scarcity principle 
operating so powerfully on the worth we assign things, it is natural that 
compliance professionals will do some related operating of their own~ 
Probably the most straightforward use of the scarcity principle occurs in 
the limited-number tactic, when the customer is informed that a certain 
product is in short supply that cannot be guaranteed to last long. 
41 MONACO, supra note 2. 
42 I d., dust jacket. 
43 Monaco's book is divided into six chapters: (1) Film as an Art, (2) Technology: 
Image and Sound, {3) The language of Film: Signs and S ntax, (4) The Shape of 
Film History, (5) Film Theory: Form and Function, and (6 Media. His book also 
contains three appendices: (I) A Standard Glossary for Film and Media Criticism, 
(II) Reading About Film and Media, and (III) Film and Media: A Chronology. Id. 
at xiii-xv. 
44 I d. at 121. 
45 Id. 
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television images, fot example, months before they begin to 
develop a facility with spoken Ianguage;"46 moreover, "[e]ven 
cats watch television."47 Thus, 11it is not necessary to acquire 
intellectual competence in film in order to appreciate it, at least 
on the most basic level. "48 Nevertheless, as Monaco asserts, 
there are varying gradations of sophistication in understanding 
and interpreting visual media and, therefore, "film is very 
much like Ianguage"49 because: 
People who are highly experienced in filtn, highly literate 
visually (or should we say 11Cinemate1f?), see more and hear 
more than people who seldom go to the movies. An education 
in the quasi-language of film opens up greater potential 
meaning for the observer, so it- is useful to use the metaphor of 
language to describe the phenomenon of film. so 
Accordingly, research has established that film images are 
comprehended differently by children than by adults, and that 
th.ere are "-cultural differences in [the] perception of images."51 
Monaco concludes that film images must be "read": "There is a 
process of intellection occurring not necessarily 
consciously when we observe an image, and it follows that 
we must have learned, at some point, how to do this."52 
Similarly, according to Monaco, the process of visual 
media "perception and comprehension involves the brain: it is 
a mental experience as well as a physical one,"53 and "there is a 
strong element of our ability to observe images, whether still or 
moving, that depends on learning11.54 Interestingly, Monaco 
p.osits that the reason why film and TV images are 
psychologically so compelling and persuasive is that a. visual 
image does not "suggest''55 as an author or speaker suggests by 
choosing certain words, which semiologists call "signifiers." 
Si . · · ers" are the collection of letters or sounds that require 
hard intellectual work in translating into a ntt:mber of possible 
46 Id . 
. 47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Jd. 
51 Id. Monaco summarizes some relevant research on cultural differences in the 
.. . 
perception of film imag~s: In one famous 19~0s test, anthropolo~ist William 
Hudson set out to examme whether rural Afrtcans who had had little contact 
with Western culture perceived depth in two-dimensional images the same way 
that Europeans do. He found unequivocally, that they do not. Id~ 
52 ld. at 122. 
53 I d. at 123. 
54 Id. 
ss I d. at 128. 
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11si · ieds," which are meanings that the words or sounds 
represent56 Rather, according to Monaco, a visual i111age 
"states. 1157 The political risk to a culture presented by visual 
images, then, is that it is easy to watch a film, for example, and 
not do the difficult mental work of translating si · iers into 
si · · eds. As Monaco explains: · 
[F]ilm is like a language. How, then, does it do what it does? 
Clearly, one person's image of a certain object is not another's. 
If we both read the words "rose .. you may perhaps think of a 
Peace rose you picked last summei, while I am thinking of the 
one [a former girlfriend] gave to me in December 1968. In 
cinema, however, we both see the same rose, while the 
filmn1aker can choose from an infinite variety of roses and then 
photograph the one chosen in another infinite variety of ways. 
The artist's choice in cinema is without limit; the artist's choice 
in literature is circumscribed, while the reverse is true for the 
observer. Film does not suggest in this context: it states. And 
therein lies its power and the danger it poses to the observer: 
the reason why it is useful, even vital, to learn to read images 
well so that the observer can seize some of the power of the 
medium. The better one reads an image, the more one 
understands it, the more power one has over it. The reader of 
a page invents the image, the reader of a film does not, yet 
both readers must work to interpret the signs they perceive in 
order to complete the process of intellection. The more work 
they do, the better the balance between observer and creator in 
the process; the better the balance, the more vital and resonant 
the work of art.ss 
The integrated insights of Mauet, Cialdini, and Monaco 
provide a solid intellectual foundation for exploring the key 
epistemological theories of When Law Goes Pop. The crux of 
Professor Sherwin's lament in When Law Goes Pop might be 
phrased in the following terms: we are all postmodernists now. 
In the first place, in Sherwin•s view, Americans are quite aware 
at the outset of the 21st century that all reality is "constructed" 
and that there is no such thing as 11ideal truth" or no such thing 
as "objectivist rationality" in the philosophical tradition of Plato 
and Descartes. 59 As Sherwin puts it 
If it is all being constructed, we can hear postmodern anxiety 
whisper, isn't one construction as true (or as false) as any 
other? This fear is fueled by advances in communication 
technology that increasingly blur the line between fiction and 
reality (from digitally manipulated photography and videos to 
56 I d. at 127. 
57 ld. at 128. 
ss Id. (emphasis in original). 
59 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 220-21. 
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computerized simulations of reality), and by the shrewd 
exploitation of that confusion by savvy advertisers; politicians, 
and lawyers alike.6o 
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. In the second place, Sherwin argues, Americans now know 
that irrational forces play a si · -"cant role in httman conduct. 
As "a variety of irrational forces flood into consciousness," 
Sherwin notes, 11{t]he contingencies of fate, chance, fury, and 
desire threaten to overwhelm the mind, oppressing it with 
feelings of helpless passivity."61 
Sherwin is concerned that in response to these consciously 
known. indeterminate epistemological realities of the 
postmodern condition, American juries and judges are 
increasingly unconsciously adopting what he describes as the 
11skeptical postmodemism ... strategy" of either 11 (adopting a 
posture of] bemused irony"62 or "diving into the flow, in a 
triut11ph of Sadean or Nietzschean rapture. 1163 For Sherwin, 
however, the "grim dilemma1164 posed by the two prongs of the 
interpretative skeptical postmodernism strategy for legal 
orderin,g is an "unnecessary and illusory" type of "hobson's 
choice."65 According to Sherwin's thesis~ "there is a middle 
way, a way in which opposing forces and disparate modes of 
knowing, · · g, and talking interpenetrate· in varied and 
complex fashion."66 Sherwin's '1middle way" is attainable 
through what he calls an "affirmative postmodem. 
60 ld. In sum, as the modernist benchmark for ideal truth and objectivist 
rationality glves way to constructivist insights; the task of judgment becomes a 
far more complicated matter~ For rtow the search for objective truth must give 
way to the task of choosing among competing warrants for a variety of disparate 
truth claims. ld. 
61 ld. Indeed, as Sherwin asserts: 
I d. 
Faced with an onslaught of uncontrollable forces both within and. 
without, the subject faces a crisis of identity and a foreboding sense that 
individual agency itself may no longer make sense. For how can one 
expect to direct events or even control one's own actions when irrational 
forces like chance and desire mock the best efforts of deliberation and 
intentionality? 
62 This strategic choice, according to Sherwin, entails a more. or less stable 
posture of guarded detachment, to defend against the duel dangers of incessant 
-deception on the one hand and destabilizing incoherence on the other. I d. (emphasis 
added). 
63 Id. 
64 . The dilemma consists, in Sherwin's view, of an either/ or strategic 
interpretative choice of the following: to play (or at least bemusedly watch) the 
manipulative games of language or to leap beyond language into the primary, 
incommunicable flux of irrational forces that surround and irif.use our words and 
images. Jd. at 221. 
65 ld. 
66 ld. 
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perspective."67 'I'his perspective is an embellishment of what 
Ernst Cassirer, in his 1946 book Language and Myth, termed 
"mature constructivism."68 As Sherwin posits: 
In the postmodem era we are burdened with the awareness 
that we live within forms of knowledge and belief that we both 
inherit and create. Thus, unlike those who dwelled among the 
Homeric myths, we know that the mythic forms in which we 
live, that establish our world, are subject to critical scrutiny. 
They may be deliberately affirmed or disavowed. The 
responsibility for meaning operates on both a collective 
(cultural) and an individual (cognitive) level. We needn't accept 
the proffered warrants for enchantment. But we may. The question, 
therefore, is not Whether we should be suspicious of enchantment. 
Rather, we must ask under what conditions should .suspicion as 
opposed to belief prevail ?69 
In essence, therefore, Sherwin conceives of the problem of 
persuasion in a postmodem socie,ty, like early 21st century 
America, as the burden we all bear. This burden, 
mythologically linked to the story of Adam and Eve, who 
sampled the forbidden fruit of The Tree of Knowledge is one of 
too much sensate, surface knowledge and too little deep 
understanding. For Sherwin, Americans, reacting to the 
disenchantnient of too many theories of htJman behavior, too 
many unmaskings of psychological motivation, and too much 
information running through their brains1 have recently 
armored their psyches with a "hyper-estheticized and radically 
amoral perspective. 'i70 This perspective is, according to 
Sherwin, the modus operandi of filmmakers like Quentin 
Tarantino71 and Oliver Stone, and it is the .. skeptical 
67 Id~ 
68 ld. (quoting ERNsr CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH (1946)). 
69 ld. (emphasis added) (endnote omitted). 
70 I d. at 224. 
71 According to Sherwin's critical review of Tarantino: 
Everything . . . comes to b~ seen as an image within a vast flux of 
multiple, disparate images, a surface upon which our gaze falls seeking 
a response to the. c;entral reality-defining query: how does it make me 
Jeel? This is the image as commodity. If I consume it, what is its 
payoff? In short, the sensation it offers is its own reward. And in that 
reward lies the ortly truth we may lay claim to. It is in the context of 
such a morally depleted, wholly esth.eticize'd perspective that Tarantino 
may be understood when he says: 
I don't take violence very seriously. I find violence funny, 
especially in the stories, I've been telling recently. Violence is part 
of this world and I am drawn to the outrageousness~ of real-life 
violence. It isn1t about lowering people from helicopters on to 
speeding trains, or about terrorists hijacking somethirig or other. 
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posbnodem defense in action" that serves to undermine our 
legal and political values.72 As Sherwin observes, the very 
meaning of our public culture is endangered as exemplified in. 
situations ranging 
[f]rom the Sitnpson double murder trial to the constitutional 
~risis of the Clinton impeachment proceeding . . . . 
Estheticized responses (what does the image make us feel?) and 
estheticized judgments (how does it create that effect?) ·threaten to 
take the place of reflective judgment (what self, social, legal and 
political reality are these images constructing? to what end? how do 
they make power flow? who benefits? who lose$?). The flow of 
power in society is real, with real effects; it•s n·o joke. We 
cannot afford to feel superior, in an ironically detached way to 
the symbolic cultural forms that help to make up who we are 
and the reality we live in.73 
Sherwin's project on popular culture and the law, it seems, 
is an extension and elaboration of Cialdini's "weapons of 
irtfluence. "74 Thus, by way of illustration, Sherwin would 
probably agree that American jurors and citizens will tend to 
repay a· legal image maker like Johnnie Cocluan and a political 
imagemeister like Bill Clinton, who makes them feel outraged, 
appreciated, or justified as the case may be, with a reciprocated 
verdict or vote of confidence. Likewise, Sherwin would likely 
find explanatory power in the continued popularity of Bill 
Clinton in spite of his . perjury and obstruction of justice, 
because Clinton is a likeable character (he plays the saxophone, 
enjoys fast food and rock-n-roll, and "feels our pain"), and the 
electorate ·had committed to electing and re-electing the man in 
spite of early knowledge of his colorful lifestyle. Also, the fact 
that Clinton's public approval rating remained high in spite of 
Real life violence 'is, you're in a restaurant and a man and his wife 
are having an argument and all of a sudden that guy .gets so mad at 
her, he picks up a fork and stabs her in the face. That,s really crazy 
and comic bookish but it also happens •. ~ . To me, violerice is a 
totally aesthetic subject. 
1 d. at 224-25( endnote o.mitted). 
72 I d. at 226. Shel"W'in writes the following about Oliver Stone's vision: 
Perceiving the real world through .. ~ a skeptical postmodem screen 
turns reality into TV reality: surfaces to gaze on, to consume, for the 
sake of imme.diate (albeit free-floating) gratification. This is what 
filinmaker Oliver Stone seems to have had in mind when he referred to 
the mass medta•s effort to arouse everywhere a fascination without 
scruples resulting in a paralysis of meaning, to the profit of a single 
scenario. lt is the same skeptical postmodem esthetic that prompts 
audiences to laugh in the face of horror and perversion. 
I d. at 225 (endnote omitted). 
73 I d. at 2.26 (emphasis in original). 
74 See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text. 
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his questionable behavior was social proof that he was a "good" 
president, and Clinton was masterful in using the trappings of 
the Presidency (the Presidential S.eal, visual shots of him 
saluting the Marine guard as he alighted from the Presidential 
helicopter, and the like) to maintain his authority. Indeed, 
Sherwin would tend to share Cialdini's concern about 
uautomatic, mindless compliance11 in American society, "that is, 
a willingness to say yes without · · ·. ing first" in the face of 
''the ever-acceleratirlg pace and informational crush of 
[contemporary] life"75 and affirm Cialdini's conclusion that it 
11Will be increasingly important for [American] society .. ~ to 
understand the how and why of automatic influence. n76 In this 
regard, Professor Sherwin has made a si . · ·cant contribution 
by providing a powerful explanation of how and why .key 
actors in American legal and political systems jurors, judges 
and citizens are often automatically influenced by aesthetic 
artistry of contemporary filinmakers. In the processi Sherwin 
has also added to the corpus of what Mauet refers to as 
"p·ersuasion law": 11the psychology of persuasion" that 
"fascinates true trial lawyers11 who 11spend a lifetime learning 
about, and learning how to apply, psychology in the 
courtroom. n71 Yet, Sherwin's book, which emphasizes the 
influence of contemporary filmmaking on the American legal 
and p·olitical ethos, also provides useful and important 
explanatory insights on Monaco's call that we nlearit to read 
[film] irnages well."78 
B. The Problem of Understanding and Dealing With the 
.. Jurisprudence of Appearances." ·· 
Sherwin provides a number of interesting and irnportant 
insights in his book on what he calls "the jurisprudence of 
appearances."79 First, he conceptua]izes the crux of the 
problem of the jurisprudence of appearances as •'repression [by 
legal actors like judges and jurors] through unconscious 
displacement onto others of illicit and thus highly unpalatable 
impulses and desires."so Second, he identifies the genesis of the 
problem to be the extraordinarily potent influence that 
contemporary popular visual media has had on "legal meaning 
75 CIALDINI, supra note 27, at xiv. 
76 Id. 
n MAUET, supra note 21, at 1-2. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
7S MONACO, supra note 2, at 128. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. 
79 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 10. . 
so I d. at 9. 
• 
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making."81 As Sherwin notes, "When law goes pop punitive 
retribution against the predatory other the 'alien1 among us, 
that perennial favorite of film and TV as well as 'real' law-
becomes easy, perhaps too easy" because "legal meaning 
making ... adopts the media's [seductive and confusing] visual 
logic as its own.us2 In this regard, Sherwin posits a helpful 
urule of thumb" and related corollary about the so-called 
"visual logic" of contemporary popular culture: 
Whatever the visual mass media touch bears the mark of 
reality I fiction confusion. There is also a corollary to the rule: 
once you enter the realm of appearances it may ·be difficult to 
control how the image spins.83 ·. 
'I'hird, in what is no doubt one of the best parts of the book, 
When Law Coes Pop offers a compelling analysis of filmmaker 
Errol Morris' 1988 "so-called documentary11'84 film, The Thin 
Blue Line, to illustrate Sherwin's concern about popular 
culture's impact on American legal meaning making .. 85 Indeed, 
my personal viewing and understanding of this landmark, but 
hard to· get,,86 film87 was greatly enhanced by Sherwin's 
commentary. The Thin Blue Line is a film that the New York 
Ti·mes described as follows: 
H Randall Adams. and David Harris can agree on anything, it•s 
that fate dealt them a terrible hand ·when, on Saturday, 
November 2'1, 1976, it threw them together. Mr. Ada1ns knows 
that his whole life would have been different if he hadn't run 
out of gas that morning, if he hadn't been hitchhikin~ and if 
Mr~ Harris hadn't picked him up. Mr. Harris, who gave Mr~ 
Adams a ride in a car he had stolen a day earlier, wonders 
what would have happened if Mr. Adams, who was living in a 
seedy Dallas motel with his brother, hadn't refused to give him 
.81 I d. at 10. 
82 ld. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). According to Sherwin, when [law goes pop] 
enters the domain of the hyper real, a realm in which appearances battle 
appearances for the s~ke of appearances C and where images risk spinning out of 
control. Id. at141. 
' 
83 Id. at 141. 
84 .ld. at 107. 
85 Errol Morris, Director, The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, 1988) (cited 
in SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 107, n. 2). 
86 l was able to rent the video from Facets Multi-media, Inc., 1517 West Fullerton 
Ave., Chicago, IL 60614. Facets is an. incomparable video rental resource that 
makes their bounty available to maihordering cus.tomers as well as the more. 
traditional in-stor~ord~ring customer~. See g_enerally; Facets Compl~te Video 
Catalog No. 15 (Cathenne Foley & Milos Stehlik, eds. 1999) (catalogmg over 
35,000 films in assorted film categories). 
87 The Thin Blue Line, despite its current obscurity, was included in The New York 
Times Guide to the Best 1,DOO Movies Ever Made (ed. Peter M. Nichols 1999) at 866-
67~ 
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a place to sleep. 
But the lw'o men did meet and spend the day together, and 
they did wind up at a drive-in where a film called Swinging 
Cheerleaders was being shown. Mr. Adams, who was then a 
twenty-eight-year-old drifter, says he didn't like the movie and 
insisted on going home before it was over, leaving Mr. Harris 
to roam on his own. 'Mr. Harris, then a sixteen-year-old 
runaway, says the twosome were at the drive-in until midnight 
or so. The time is crucial, because at twelve-thirty A.M. a 
Dallas police officer named Robert Wood s:aw the stplen car 
moving with only its parking lights on. He signaled for the car 
to stop, walked over to talk to the driver, and the driver killed 
h.&.L&i rn.ss· 
Sherwin devotes over thirty pages of his book to 
dissecting The Thin Blue Line. The most striking .of his many 
perspicacious observations about the film are the following: (1) 
that "Morris' lead story irt that film made so many people 
disbelieve the state's trial story that the (Texas] courts 
eventually reexamined th.e case"89 and that this 11reexamination 
led to Randall Adams' release from prison"90; (2) that the 11film 
lays out two contemporaneous but opposing plot lines"; to wit, 
nthe story as told in a classically linear fashion (be · · g, 
development, conclusion), and a provocative, unresolved 
nonlinear narrative"91; (3) that the fi]m "is curious in that it 
88 Id. at 866. 
89 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 107-108. 
90 Id. at 108. Adams had served twelve years, a good part of it on death row. In 
marty people's eyes Morris's film served as the key catalyst in righting a terrible 
wrong. By helping to set Randall Dale Adams free the film also helped set the 
Dallas criminal justice system straight. Id. (endnote· omitted). 
91 Id. at 115. As Sherwin explains: 
The classic linear story line is perhaps best exemplified by the familiar 
genre of the detective story wherein the detective-hero, by identifying 
and combining significant clues, resolves a disturbing mystery. In 
Morris1s film, the audience as detective/ juror traces the clues that point 
to a siniste;r plot by state officials to frame Randall Dale Adams. The 
clues fit neatly into a story that ends when the mystery of the frame-up 
is revealed and solved. Once revealed, the plot is obvious and familiar. 
Lies, corruption, and abuse of power made Adams a scapegoat for a 
crime he did not commit. 
The fitm•s opposing plot line operates within the_ context of a less 
familiar, nonlinear (arguably posbnodem) narrative form. Rather than 
offering closure, this form leaves a disquieting sense of ~dequate 
resolution and residual mystery. Was Harris the gunman? If he was, is 
that all there is to the story? What about the loose ends? Where was 
Adams at the time of the murder? What were the two of them up to 
that day? Does it take a serendipitous interview with an artful 
filmmaker to save a prisoner from life in jail or death by electrocution? 
What if the plotting qf chance or fate actually played a larger part in the 
criminal justice system? Surely such uncontrollability of events and 
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simultaneously enacts and refutes the classic modern narrative 
of straight-arrow truth and constant justice .. 92; and (4) that "[i]n 
a film about the different forms of deception, Morris leaves 
room to realize that certainty often demands self-deception."93 
Sherwin provides a fourth noteworthy exposition of the 
jurisprudence of appearances by his discussion of how 
contemporary visual media 11that combines quick gratification 
through intellectual relaxation, emotional excitement, and 
escapism" in its portrayal of "[l]aw stories"94 h.as perniciously 
shaped the cognitive pathways of the American public in a w.ay 
that makes them vulnerable to manipulative distortion when 
making public judgments in the legal realm.. The manipulation 
occurs, according to Sherwin, as 11savvy litigators with 
increasing frequency emulate the popular cultural constructs 
and visual storytelling techniques that dominate the culture at 
large'19s and, in the process; create a 11conflation of tru~ and 
fiction, image and reality, fact and fantasy."96 
Fifth, the jurisprudence of appearances is also played out 
"outside the courtroom as well, as a growing number of 
lawyers deploy the strategies of public relations using sourtd 
bytes, photo-ops, and a variety of spin control tactics to win 
their cases in the court of public opinion/'97 to affect the course 
of litigation and the legal rulings in a case.98 Thus, Sherwin 
explains how "(w]ith the advent of litigation public relations 
we see how legal advocates exploit the visual mass media's 
tendency to blur the line between reality and fiction. "99 
Finally, Sherwin discerns a "cultural crisis'' in what he 
comprehends as the jurisprudence of appearances run amok. 
He writes: 
[Legal and political spinmasters'] wi11ingness to use the media 
to manipulate desire; to conflate fantasy and reality, and to 
merge self-identity with self-gratifying acts of consumption 
regardless of whether the commodity consumed is a product, a 
political candidate, or a matter of law is contributing to a 
human actions dissipates in rather short order, the complacent all's right 
with the world because truth and justice will out in the end attitude that 
the linear story would have us believe. 
Id. (endnote omitted). 
92 I d. at 116-17. 
93 I d. at 121. 
94 I d. at 143. 
95 I d. at 146. 
96 Id. 
w Id. 
98 Id. at 148-150. 
99 I d. at 152. 
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significant cultural crisis. Powerful irrational forces seem to be 
irrupting all around us. Chance events and uncontrollable 
impulses threaten to subvert rational explanation, throwing 
causation itseH into doubt. New forms of associative thinking 
and disparate logics are eroding conventional notions of 
modern reason and the autonomous self. An emerging sense 
of contingency of the historical, cultural and psychological 
constructedness of self and social reality is making it harder to 
agree upon shared moral and ethical standards for community 
life.lOO 
C. The Problem of Popular Culture's Illicit Impact on Legal 
Advocacy 
In Sherwin's view, as expresse.d in When Law Goes Pop, it is 
highly problematic to the proper functioning of law that 
contemporary pop culture arouses illicit, secret, and 
unexamined impacts on American jurisprudence. He sums up 
his concern in this area by arguing: 
The convergence of law and popular culture . . . provides an 
account of increasing distortions within the discourse 
competencies of both the public and the judiciary. It alsQ 
s.uggests a growing irrtbalance in the distribution of various 
discourse competencies within the legal system as a whole. A 
synergistic convergence of skeptical postmodem theory, 
communications technology, and the insistent gratification 
demands of the marketplace is leading to a flattening out of 
disparate discourse competencies. Common sense and to an 
increasing extent legal discourse and knowle,dge are showing 
signs of collapsing into· the same. gratification-based esthetic 
that dominates contemporary popular culture. It is precisely 
this distortion that [exists] . . . with the advent of the 
jurisprudence of appearances and the litigation public relations 
movement. As a result, the discrete virtues of popular 
knowledge and discourse, like those of the judiciary, which 
must at times operate as a brake upon popular opinion, are 
being encumbered and diminished.1o1 
Professor Sherwin suggests, in other words, that the. 
distorting affect of popular culture's unexamined impact on 
legal reasoning is 11up for grabs: causation, the autonomy and 
moral responsibility of the individual, and the coherence of 
reason itself."102 Moreover, this crisisi in Sherwin's view, 
represents 11the foremost legal challenge of our time~ "103 
Sherwin, however, urges a rather ambiguous remedy to 
this ''crisis." He argues that "[w]e must begin to 
too Id. at 168-169. 
tm I d. at 240-41. 
102 Jd. at 169. 
103 Id. 
2001] AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 183 
reconceptualize and relegitimize law in a way that is consonant 
with current lived realities, which is to say, with the cultural 
constructs and anxieties actually circulating in society."104 If we 
take this path, Sherwin tells us, the "effort will lead us from 
hyper-catharsis to real catharsis in the face of tragic suffering 
and the affirmative potential of legal enchantment. "105 
It is difficult, however, to find a clear explanation of how 
Sherwin w·ould specifically change things. Ultimately, it 
see,ms, Sherwin advocates a return to ancient classical 
rhetorical principles as a cure for our crisis of legal meaning-
making.106 The following excerpt, while general and idealistic, 
is Sherwin's best articulation in When Law Goes Pop of his 
solution: 
I believe that [my] affirmative postmodern perspectiye ... has 
much in common with [a] pre-Platonic perspective. 
Postmodern constructivist insights have shown us in a broad 
range of social and cultural and even scientific contexts that the 
particular form of expression-the discourse, the metaphor, 
the visual image that is used -is essential to the kind of truth 
that may be expressed. This is not to say that truth is reducible 
to esthetics, that content equals style, as the fifth-century 
Gorgian Sophists and their contemporary skeptical 
postmodern counterparts seem to believe. Rather, it is to 
acknawledge the . complexity, contingency, and multiplicity of truth 
and reason. It is to accept the interpenetration of truth, morality, 
and esthetics as well as of reason and the irrational in all its varied 
forms and disguises. And it is to affirm responsibility for choosing 
among the disparate claims to truth and reason that confront us 
when conflicts demand resolution. · 
On this view it becomes apparent that we share a deep insight 
with rhetoricians like !socrates and Philip Sidney. Without the 
fictional method, without the efficacy of verisimilitude, and the 
motivating power of emotion, truth. may sirnply fail to come to 
life in the mind107• 
• 
On the one hand, Sherwin's suggested approach is 
worthwhile because it tries to imaginatively synthesize 
theoretical parallels between pre-Platonic rhetoricians and 
present 21st century post-modem cultural practices. On the 
other hand the lingering generality of its · prescription for . 
reform is reminiscent of other recent, trendy, somewhat. 
shallow calls for reform that we, for example, "Act for the best, 
104 Id. 
10s Id. 
106 See id~ at228. It may be that current developments in culture, technology, and 
the history of ideas have led us to a fork irt the road similar to the one Plato 
faced. Id. 
to7 Id. at 229. 
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hope for the best, and take what comes. n1os 
lll. 'fHE NATURE OF AES'I'HETIC-LEGAL JUDGMENT IN A 
CULTURE OF LAW 
Despite its abstract and jargon-infused quality109, V\lhen 
Law Goes Pop has a si · · icant redeeming aspect it is a creative 
contribution to what one legal theorist has called 11 the key issue 
in legal scholarship today,"11o which is the indeterminacy 
debate about whether law or things outside of the law 
"determine the outcome of particular legal disputes."llt 
Rooted in a philosophy that posits that the rule of law is 
not radically £nterdeterminate, but rather moderately 
underdetermined (by 'SUch factor~. as political ideology, class 
background, racial and gender identification and the like);112 
the singular si . · ·cance of Professor Sherwin's book, When Law 
Goes Pop, is that it urges the incorporation of aesthetic judgment 
into the calculus of how law should determine human 
disputes. As such, Sherwin extends and elaborates the recent 
p~th breaking work of Professor Paul W. Kahn, who in The 
Cultural Study of Law113 called for "a legal aesthetic" consisting 
of a Kantian-inspired 11Study of the time and spa~ce within 
which legal experience, both belief and practice-; becomes 
possible."114 · 
The crux of Sherwin's original contribution to the cultural 
study of law is his melding of the insight that there exists 
multiple forms of "truth'' in postmodern America, including the 
critical 11 truth" of irrational emotion, with his plea for an 
American "tragic wisdom11 gestalt that would serve to ..,cultivate 
108 ALAN C!' HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NONFOUNDATIONALIST 
ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATibN 331 (2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted; endnotes omitted). 
t09 See supra note 17 and accom.panying text. 
no Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1990). 
111 Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
112 Id. at 489-99. 
tt3 KAHN, supra note 1. 
114 I d. at 40. Kahn went on to note: 
I d. 
The rule of law is an organization of institutions, practices, persons and 
objects within the ongoing historical and spatial project that is the state. 
The state occupies time and space not as an object in the natural world, 
but as an imaginative construction of tempered and spatial meanings. 
The state• s time is history; its space is territory. These are the subjects of 
a legal aesthetic. 
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our capacity for enchantm.ent."115 "Enchantment," for Sherwin, 
connotes the requisite social and institutional maturity to 
transmogrify the conflict of necessary le-gal rituals into 
sufficient symbolic cultural meanings.t16 
When Law Goes Pop is important because, at its heart, it 
polemically applies two valuable theoretical constructs to the 
study of law · one from the field of personal psychology, the 
other from art. First; Sherwin makes out a convincing; albeit 
implicit, case that "the struggle for meaning, .. which Bruno 
Bettelheim examined on the personal aesthetic level in the his, 
book The Uses of Enchantment, needs to be taken up by the 
American legal system.117 Sherwin's book, indeed, resonates 
with the following excerpt from Bettelheim's monumental 
work: 
If we hope to live not just from moment to moment,. but in true 
consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and 
most difficult ac.hievement is to find meaning in our lives. It ~ 
well known how many have lost the will to live, ·and have 
stopped trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An 
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not suddenly 
acquired at a particular age; not even when one has reached 
chronological maturity. On the contrary, gaining a secure 
understanding of what the meaning of one's life may or ought 
to be this is what constitutes psychological maturity. And this 
achievement is the end result of a long development .... 
Contrary to the ancient myth, wisdom does not burst forth 
-fully developed ~e Athena out of Zeus's headi it is built up, 
small step by small step, from most irrational beginnings.11s 
Second, Sherwin has created a vision of the flottrishlng of 
the American legal system by his call for a sophisticated 
collective consciousness that incorporates "a symbolic as well 
as a practical dimension to legal adjudication"lt9 and his 
implicit agreement with the aesthetic theory of James Joyce's 
character, Stephen Dedalus, in the book Portrait of the· Artist as a 
Young Man.120 The Joycean theory is that "true11 art should seek 
to achieve objective stasis through "wholeness, harmony, and 
radiance," not subjective kinesis 'Of desire or loathing.121. 
tts SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 230. 
116 Id. Sherwin observes: Culhtre~ like art and ... law cannot flourish without. 
the enchantment of esthetics, what the ancient Greeks called terpsis. Id. 
117 BRUNO BETfELHEIM, THE USFS OF ENCHANTMENT: THE ME;ANING AND 
IMPORTANCE OF FAIR)' TALES (1977). 
ltS I d. at 3~ 
119 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 230. 
120 }AMES JOYCE, PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN (1916). 
121 See generally 'WILUAM YORK TINDALL, A READER'S GUIDE TO JAMES JOYCE 94-100 
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Sherwin, then, would urge American judges and jurors to 
deploy their post-mode.m aesthetic judgment, stimulated by 
their exposure to fi1.nt media, not to satisfy subjective fears and 
wishes but, rather, to achieve a coherent social co-nception of 
justice in an individual case. --
IV. CONCLUSION 
Richard Sherwin's V\lhen Law Goes Pop, while difficult to 
read and decipher because of its repetitive use of abstract 
jargon, is, nonetheless, a fascinating and valuable contribution 
to the cultural stu.dy of law. Sherwin raises a number of 
interesting issues including the problem of persuasion in a 
post-modern society, the problem of understanding and 
dealing with the 11jurisprudence of appearances," and the 
problem of ·popular culture's illicit impact on legal advocacy. 
The most significant aspect of When Law Goes Pop, how·ever, is 
its endorsement of aesthetic-legal judgment to achieve deep 
cultural meaning in 21st century America. 
(1959). 
